Tungsten knows first
A small mine in Tasmania has opened and closed for a century to the rhythm of war. The price of tungsten has risen ninefold in eighteen months. Defence is budgeted in euros and made of kilograms.
Off the coast of Tasmania lies the Dolphin Mine. It opened in 1917 and closed in 1920. Production resumed in 1938. In the early 1950s the Korean War gave the company its boom years. In 1990, the year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the mine shut at an extremely low tungsten price. In 2023 it opened again. The twentieth century can be read here in the opening hours of a single business.
The mine produces tungsten, the metal with the highest melting point there is, almost 3,500 degrees, more than twice that of iron. It is so hard that you would rather not work with it unless you must, says Benjamin Sprecher of Delft University of Technology, director of the Centre for Materials & Resilience. In peacetime the market is therefore small. In wartime it goes into cruise missiles, armour, fighter aircraft and submarines, and besides that into drill bits, semiconductors and X-ray equipment. According to the report the centre published with the University of Birmingham on 17 August, the European price rose roughly ninefold between February 2025 and June 2026. The market is sometimes called a predictor of war, because trading picks up as soon as tensions rise.
China mines 79 per cent of the world’s tungsten and does 86 per cent of the processing. In February 2025, after the American import tariffs, it placed exports under licensing, and since January 2026 no tungsten may go to Japan for military use. In August 2026 the United States banned exports of tungsten scrap, with exemptions on application, so that it is recycled at home. From 1 January 2027, American defence contracts may no longer contain tungsten from China, Russia, North Korea or Iran. A European strategy is missing, Sprecher says, and according to the report the United States, Japan and South Korea are all further ahead than the EU.
So much for the news. What interests me is the unit in which we talk about it.
The European defence debate is conducted in percentages of gross domestic product. Two per cent, three and a half, five. That is a measure of effort, chosen because it is easy to compare. It says little about capability. An armour plate is made of kilograms of a particular metal, processed in a particular place, and money that cannot be converted into those kilograms remains money. A budget that doubles while the raw material becomes nine times dearer and lead times lengthen buys less than last year. The percentage target records that as progress.
The second lesson is about time. Between 2014 and 2018 tungsten was cheap, and in those years European projects and mines were shut down, among them a large mine in the United Kingdom. In each of those years that was a reasonable decision. A mine is an investment of decades, the price moves by the quarter, and no financier commits money to something China can make unprofitable with a single decision to open the tap again. Sprecher says as much himself. The market did what markets do, and the result is that the capacity is missing at the moment it is needed. Capacity for bad times is always too expensive in good times.
The Dutch firm Sietzema Techniek, which coats machinery with a tungsten layer against wear so that it sometimes lasts ten times longer, feels it as lengthening lead times and a shrinking margin. Its operations director says a company suddenly finds itself depending on large geopolitical forces. It always did. The price simply did not show it.
What the report proposes is modest and therefore credible. Europe already recycles tungsten reasonably well, but part of the scrap still goes to Japan and processing sits largely in China. An export levy on scrap, such as the one the EU was reported in June to be preparing for aluminium, keeps the material here. Public contracts that ask for recycled tungsten give processors a market. And long-term price guarantees make a mine or a plant financeable, because the state then takes the risk no investor can take: that the price falls again.
Such a guarantee is an insurance premium. It costs money in the years when nothing happens, and a government that judges it by those years abolishes it. A continent that measures its security in percentages has an interest in keeping a second table beside it: how many tonnes, processed where, and enough for how many months.
Sources: Benjamin Sprecher and Gavin Harper, ‘Tungsten Supply and China’s Export Controls’, Centre for Materials & Resilience (Delft University of Technology) and Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements & Critical Materials, 17 August 2026 (doi 10.5281/zenodo.20815821): the price rise, China’s shares of mining (79%) and processing (86%), the Chinese and American measures, Hemerdon (2015–2018), the aluminium levy and the recommendations. NOS, 19 August 2026, for Sprecher on China reopening the tap. History of the Dolphin Mine: King Island Scheelite / Group 6 Metals. Liza van Lonkhuyzen, ‘De markt van wolfraam wordt gezien als voorspeller van oorlog’, NRC, 17 August 2026 (in Dutch): the Dolphin Mine, Sprecher on hardness and the missing strategy, Sietzema Techniek of Gorredijk (operations director Kor de Vries) and the scrap going to Japan.